Ghazali on Immaterial Substances by Hennig, Boris
Ghazali on Immaterial Substances 
 
BORIS HENNIG, SAARBRÜCKEN 
 
 
1. Preamble 
 
I will in this paper attempt to extract a positive doctrine on the 
substantiality of the human soul from Ghazali’s critique of the Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition. Rather than reflecting on the possibilities and 
limitations of intercultural dialogue, my aim is to directly engage in such 
dialogue. Accordingly, I will not suppose that we need to develop and 
apply external standards according to which one of the two philosophical 
traditions addressed here, Western and Islamic, may turn out to be 
superior. Up to a certain point, Western and Islamic philosophy are 
virtually indistinguishable regarding their style, the main topics, and the 
arguments discussed, which both take over from Aristotle and the 
Neoplatonists. Further, at least up to Ghazali, no Islamic philosopher 
actually employs standards of rationality that would differ from the 
standards also accepted in the West. Ghazali himself would certainly be at 
least as disturbed by a valid philosophical objection to his claims as any 
other serious philosopher. He does not pursue another kind of project, but 
submits to the same standards of truth and validity, as far as philosophical 
argument reaches. His point is, of course, that these standards do not reach 
as far as some philosophers suppose. But this, again, is not a particularly 
“Islamic” insight. 
So, although I will discuss Ghazali against the background of a roughly 
outlined Western discourse about the mind as a substance, stretching from 
Augustine to Locke, this is not meant to be a confrontation between 
different styles of thinking or points of view. Insofar as Ghazali defends 
and refutes philosophical arguments, his style and point of view are 
thoroughly universal, as much as the style and point of view of Augustine, 
Descartes, and Locke. He could have directly contributed to their very 
project, and the following can be read as an attempt to reconstruct what his 
contribution might have been. I will start with a rough and superficial 
sketch of the Western philosophical tradition in question. Then I will turn 
to Ghazali by first outlining the general framework within which his talk 
about substances must be understood. I will further discuss two of the 
arguments for the eternity of material and immaterial substances that he 
draft. do not quote this version.  
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rejects. It will turn out that in order to understand how substances can 
come into being and cease to exist, we need to distinguish between two 
kinds of possibility, and accordingly between two ways in which 
possibilities may be said to inhere in an underlying substance. This will 
lead to an important and very general comment on immaterial substances: 
such substances are not related to forms and possibilities by possessing 
them as their own forms and potentials. It is precisely for this reason that it 
is misleading to think of the mind as an entity that has certain properties.  
 
2. Immaterial Substances 
 
In book VII of his Confessions, Augustine tells us that at some point in his 
life, he had an important insight when reading Neoplatonic philosophers. 
He does not name any specific Neoplatonic thinker or theorem, but his 
insight is clear and simple enough. He reports that he realized that there are 
entities that are not material: neither material substances nor properties of 
them, nor relations between such substances. Significantly, this insight 
helped him to solve the problem of evil, and the most important such thing 
he mentions is truth. In Augustine, the immaterial is the normative. 
Whereas there may perhaps be a way of identifying the established, finite 
set of all actually known facts with a set of relations between material 
objects, pieces of paper, human bodily organs, brains, their properties, and 
so on, there can be no such identification for truth. The truth always goes 
beyond the set of true assertions that we actually endorse. Since “truth” is 
also a name that Christian philosophers like Augustine habitually apply to 
God, Augustine does not hesitate to conclude that God is immaterial, and 
further, that the human soul, being made in his image, is an immaterial 
thing. 
Descartes provides a rigorous argument in support of the Augustinian 
insight. He shows, in his first two Meditations, that our understanding of 
what it means to be a thinking subject need not involve any understanding 
of what it is to have a material body. Before we accept anything else as a 
fact, we already know that we think. Thinking, Descartes explains, is 
conscious activity. This however means that consciousness itself cannot be 
another kind of thinking. First, since all thinking is conscious activity, this 
would lead to a regress. Second, it does not seem true that we explicitly 
think of everything of which we are conscious. Anyway, Descartes 
nowhere claims that consciousness is anything like introspection, self-
observation, or reflective thought. Consciousness goes beyond our actual 
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thinking in the same sense in which the truth goes beyond our actual 
asserting. This is so because similar to truth, consciousness is concerned 
with our thoughts and actions from a normative perspective. Consciousness 
is primarily concerned with the value of our own activity, and with our 
relation to this activity. Just as we need not state that what we say is true in 
a separate statement, we need not think that we think in a separate thought. 
Consciousness amounts to an implicit evaluation of a thought as our own. 
More specifically, it amounts to taking the stance that Descartes explicitly 
takes towards his own thoughts in his first two Meditations. He sets out to 
endorse only such thoughts that are most reliable that are immediately 
evident to his mind. He thus rejects all knowledge claims based on 
testimony, and all opinions that depend on possibly unreliable means, 
leaving only the thoughts that he can defend all by himself. The core 
subject of this and only this kind of activity is then called “res cogitans” – 
thinking subject. To be conscious of a thought or action is accordingly to 
regard oneself as immediately and fully responsible for defending this 
thought or action.  
That the conscious subject that Descartes isolates in the beginning of 
his Meditations is in its essence a locus for responsibility and liability for 
thoughts and actions explains, first, why Descartes can infer the existence 
of God from the existence of the conscious subject. To act responsibly is to 
suppose that there is a correct evaluation of one’s acting as good or bad, 
right or wrong, that need not coincide with any actual evaluation, not even 
one’s own. The notion of a responsible agent therefore implies the notion 
of an ideal evaluation. From this Descartes infers the existence of God, an 
ideal evaluator. Again, the truth transcends the merely factual. 
Second and more importantly, that the res cogitans is in its essence a 
responsible subject of thought and action justifies the title of a thinking 
substance; at least to a certain extent. The important point to note here is 
that an agent can only be liable and accountable for thoughts and actions 
insofar as she persists over time and is clearly distinct from other instances 
of her kind. In this sense, the subject of conscious activity can only be a 
persisting individual. Since the terms in which we trace such subjects over 
time are not the same as the means by which we identify material bodies or 
parcels of matter, it is further legitimate to speak of immaterial substances. 
The point is not that they are entirely unrelated to matter, but that there is 
something about them that cannot be captured by a purely materialistic 
description. In order to say what it means to be responsible for an action or 
a thought, we need to transcend the material and the factual, since to be 
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responsible is not the same as to be actually held responsible. This insight 
is again emphasized by Locke: persons are identified and individuated not 
merely in terms of their bodily features, but in terms of their life histories; 
more precisely, in terms of the actions and thoughts for which they are 
accountable. And Locke also makes clear that it does not matter whether 
persons are actually held responsible for what they do by other humans, or 
consider themselves responsible for what they did. What matters is the 
evaluation by God, the ideal evaluator, in the final judgment (Essay 
II,xxvii,26).  
This is, then, the motivation for calling the mind an immaterial 
substance — and for Cartesian Dualism in general. Humans subject their 
conscious thoughts and actions to an evaluation according to standards 
such as truth, correctness, goodness. But no finite, actual set of evaluations 
and meta-evaluations guarantees the satisfactions of such standards. What 
humans say may be false and what they do may be wrong even if no 
human on earth ever notices. In this sense, the standards themselves are 
immaterial. Insofar as we act and think, we are subject to a standard that 
transcends the material world, and we bear our responsibility regardless of 
what happens to our material bodies.1  Let me now turn to the ontological 
framework within which immaterial substances are traditionally located. 
 
3. Aristotelian Top-Level Ontology 
 
According to a metaphysical framework that Ghazali largely accepts, there 
are two kinds of entities: those that are in something else, such as accidents 
and forms, and those that are not in anything else (3,41,66).2 Entities that 
do not exist in any receptacle (mahal) or substratum (maudu‘) are called 
substances (jawhar, 5,24,90). There are three kinds of substances. Some 
substances are receptacles for accidents and forms; others are self-
subsistent (3,41,66). The self-subsistent substances divide into two kinds. 
Some of them are attached to substances that are receptacles; others are not 
essentially related to any other thing at all.  
Instances of the first kind of substance, which are receptacles for 
accidents and forms, are mere extension (madda) and bodies (jism). 
                                                           
1 This paragraph is a rough summary of results I develop more thoroughly in Hennig 
2006. 
2 All references are to Ghazalīi 2000, ed. Marmura. The numbers refer to the 
discussion, paragraph and page respectively, such that the above “3,41,66” refers to 
the Third Discussion (which is found in part I), §41, p. 66. I have occasionally 
modified the translation. 
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According to a view that Ghazali attributes to Avicenna, the human soul is 
a substance of the second kind: it is not itself a receptacle but  individuated 
only by being attached to a body that is a receptacle of forms and accidents 
(19,9,202-3). The third kind of substance is exemplified by the divine 
intelligences, which are immaterial, unique in their kind, and not attached 
to any particular, material body. 
 
4. The Extended Substance 
 
Ghazali further endorses an Aristotelian principle according to which every 
change requires an underlying subject that remains, in some respect, the 
same (17,36,176). The “philosophers” (Farabi and Avicenna) argue that 
when a thing comes into being, it changes from non-existence to existence, 
and hence there must be a substratum that remains the same during the 
change from non-existence to existence. Before a thing comes into 
existence, it must have been possible for it to exist, and this possibility 
must have been present in a receptacle (mahal). Therefore it seems that if 
something A is possibly coming to be, something that is already actual 
must have the potential for becoming A. Hence, the universe in its entirety 
can have no beginning, since there would have to be a receptacle for its 
possibility of coming to be. This receptacle, however, will already have to 
be an extended thing (madda, 1,113,41). 
In general, since a substance does not inhere in anything, there can be 
no substratum underlying the process by which a substance comes to be. It 
is easy to see how a property comes to be exemplified: something that may 
possibly have this property turns into something that actually has it. No 
such account, however, can be given for the way in which substances come 
into being. This appears to entail a Spinozistic ontology, according to 
which there is only one eternal substance, and everything that is subject to 
change inheres in this substance. Hence, the argument of the philosophers, 
as Ghazali states it, leads to undesirable conclusions.  
 
5. The Thinking Substance 
 
Ghazali picks up the same issue again in his discussion of the persistence 
of the soul (nafs). He begins by stating the following philosophical 
argument to the effect that the soul cannot cease to exist. A thing may 
cease to be for three reasons: by lack of support by an underlying 
substratum, by encountering its opposite, or by something else’s execution 
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of a power. But the soul does not cease to exist in the first way, since it 
needs no support from an underlying substratum. Rather than being 
imprinted in the body as its receptacle, the philosophers argue, the soul 
uses the body as a tool, and the destruction of a tool does not entail the 
destruction of its user. Second, there are no negative substances, such that 
a substance could be destroyed by encountering its negative counterpart. 
Third, the non-existence of a substance is not a positive fact and can 
therefore not be specified as a condition of success for the execution of a 
power. Since a power must be defined in terms of its successful execution, 
this means that there can be no power for destroying a substance (19,2-
5,201-2). 
These arguments are of doubtful validity. In order to establish the first, 
the philosophers would have to show that the soul does not in any sense 
depend on the body for its existence. But even if the soul is not imprinted 
in matter as its receptacle, it may still cease to exist in the absence of the 
body to which it is attached, just as humans will cease to exist in the 
absence of air without being imprinted in it. The specific way in which the 
soul depends on its body may be that it has its identity only insofar as it is 
attached to this body rather to another (19,8-15,202-4). And as Ghazali 
argues elsewhere, we do in fact never refer to ourselves without in some 
way or other referring to our body (18,53,192-93). Therefore, it might well 
be that the soul depends on the body even if it uses it only as a tool. At any 
rate, Ghazali concludes, it is not logically impossible that God should be 
able to destroy the soul, and no one guarantees that the list of possible 
ways of ceasing to be that the philosophers offer is exhaustive (19,16-
17,204-5). 
In a second round, Ghazali has the philosophers elaborate on their first 
argument. Since a substance does not exist in a receptacle, they argue, it 
cannot cease to exist. For ceasing to exist is a change, and hence, there 
must be an underlying substratum that undergoes this change. This 
substratum, however, would have to underlie all stages of the change in 
question, such that first, the substance would be supported by this 
underlying substratum as long as it exists. But a substance needs no such 
support. Second, if the substratum underlies all the stages of the soul’s 
ceasing to be, it would still have to be there in the absence of the soul—but 
there is nothing that belongs to a human being that would still be present 
when the soul has perished. This leads us back to the argument for the 
eternity of the extended substance. The substratum that remains when the 
soul has ceased to be would have to be a receptacle for a potential of a soul 
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to be, in the same way in which extension (madda) is the receptacle for a 
potential of a body (jism) to be. This however would turn the soul into a 
kind of form or accident, which would need something like extension as its 
receptacle (19,18-22,205-7).  
 
6. Ghazali’s Way Out 
 
The main argument for the eternity of both extended and thinking 
substances is thus that the potential for a substance to exist would have to 
inhere in something else as long as this substance does not exist. But then, 
there would also be a receptacle on which the substance would depend for 
its existence when it exists. 
Against this, Ghazali argues that possibilities do not require a real 
substratum and that we rather “call that possible which the intellect (caql) 
may suppose to be there without encountering a contradiction” (1,116,42). 
That is, the possibility that a substance exists is not a possibility for it to 
exist. There need only be an intellect that grasps this possibility and that is 
able to realize it. But this intellect is not the thing for which it is possible to 
exist. The intellect already exists, and the thing that possibly exists does 
not. Ghazali claims that this may be seen by considering the following 
arguments. 
First, there would have to be a substratum not only for the possibility of 
things to come into existence, but also for their refusal to do so (1,117,42).3 
Although it might seem that a refusal to be must still be the refusal of some 
existing thing to be, this is not the case. There “are” things that may never 
actually be the case. Such things need no receptacle in order not to be, and 
hence their refusal to exist does not need any receptacle (1,122,43; 
1,129,45). 
Second, Ghazali argues, that which comes into being when an accident 
comes to be in a receptacle is not an abstract and universal form (kulliya 
mujarrada, 18,9,181), but only one of its particular instances. The 
universal itself does not come to be, but still, there is a sense in which a 
non-instantiated universal is only possible and not actual. That the 
universal is possible in the sense of being possibly instantiated does not 
mean that it may itself come to be; it rather means that something else may 
                                                           
3 Marmura translates imtina‘ as “impossibility”, such that the claim would be that 
there must be a substrate for the impossible. This does not follow and “refusal” is a 
more natural translation; at any rate imtina‘ is not literally the opposite of possibility 
(imkān). 
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come to be: one of its instances. By the same token, the soul may be said to 
be possible not because there actually is a receptacle in which it may come 
to be, but rather because something else may come to be: a bodily thing to 
which the soul may come to be attached (1,118,42).  
Hence, although a universal form may only be actual by being realized 
in a particular instance, this does not mean that it needs this instance as a 
receptacle for its existence. The form does not come to be by being 
instantiated; it only comes to be instantiated. Likewise, the soul may be 
merely possible as opposed to actual as long as it is not attached to a body. 
But that does not mean that it comes to be in a body that would be its 
receptacle. It only means that it comes to be attached to a body. 
 
7. Forms vs. Intentions: Sura vs. Ma‘nan 
 
The comparison between universals, souls, and possibilities is the most 
important step in the line that Ghazali takes against the philosophers. Both 
forms and possibilities may exist without inhering in a receptacle. They 
may be said to inhere in the intellect (‘aql), but then the intellect will not be 
their receptacle—that they inhere in the intellect does not mean that the 
intellect exemplifies them.  
We have already seen that the “philosophers” distinguish between two 
kinds of substance: substances that are receptacles of forms and accidents, 
and others that are self-subsistent. According to an account that a writer 
like Avicenna might put forward and with which Ghazali agrees, there are 
also two kinds of accidents or forms. There are, corresponding to the first 
kind of substance, forms and accidents that only exist in a receptacle (sura 
= Greek morphe). These are always forms of some particular thing: 
particular form-instances that come into existence when a thing actually 
has a property. Second, corresponding to the second and third kind of 
substance, there are forms that do not require a bodily receptacle in order 
to exist (ma‘nan = Greek ennoia, translated into Latin as intentio). These 
are the universals that may be present in the mind without necessarily 
being instantiated by anything (18,3,179). In his 18th Discussion on the 
immateriality of the soul, Ghazali makes extensive use of the distinction 
between sura and ma‘nan. Although universals are indivisible, he argues, 
they may still exist in a divisible substratum such as the brain, since they 
need not be instantiated by this substratum. The soul can accordingly be in 
a body without being its form; that is, it may depend on the body for its 
existence without being imprinted in it. 
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8. Potentials Require a Receptacle, Possibilities Require a Substratum 
 
Although Ghazali himself presents his argument against the eternity of 
extended and thinking substance only in order to “throw dust in the face” 
of the alleged proofs (1,134,46), we may extract from his criticism two 
distinctions that are still of crucial importance.  
First, it has emerged that one should distinguish between the substratum 
(mawdu‘) of a universal or possibility and its receptacle (mahal). The 
receptacle of a possibility or universal is that in which it is present when it 
is actual. The receptacle of a color must be an extended thing. The 
substratum of a universal or possibility is that in which it may exist without 
necessarily being actual. The substratum of a color need not be an extended 
thing. According to Ghazali, the intellect may function as a substratum for 
universals and possibilities.  
The receptacle of a possibility can only be an existing thing that may 
eventually actualize this possibility. For instance, it is possible that my son 
catches a cold since I have a son who does that quite often. In this case, my 
son is the receptacle of a potential for getting a cold. But this is not the 
only way in which possibilities may be there. For in a different sense, it is 
possible that my daughter catches a cold, although I do not yet have a 
daughter and may never have one: it is possible that I may have a daughter 
who has a cold. These two senses in which a state of affairs is possible 
have also been distinguished in terms of de re and de dicto modality: one 
may say that it is (de re) possible for my son to catch a cold, but not 
literally that it is possible for my daughter, since there is no daughter of 
mine for it to be possible for.  
The second distinction that we may extract from Ghazali’s discussion 
of the philosopher’s “substance” is closely connected to this distinction 
between de re and de dicto modality. We may distinguish between 
possibilities that require a receptacle in order to become real and 
possibilities that do not require such a receptacle, but may exist in a 
substratum such as the intellect. The former may be called potentials of the 
receptacle in question. This distinction mirrors the division of forms into 
universals (ma‘nan) and particular form-instances (sura). Potentials are 
particular possibility-instances, as it were, and they require a receptacle in 
order to exist. De dicto possibilities do not require a receptacle, but only a 
substratum such as an intellect in order to exist. 
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9. Substance Ontology Revised 
 
Traditionally, a substance is said to be something that does not inhere in 
anything else, but in which other things such as forms and accidents inhere. 
This is, admittedly, a vague formulation, and much more would have to be 
said about what “inherence” means in this context. The question that 
Ghazali raises is whether a substance is supposed not to inhere in another 
thing (1) as its receptacle or (2) as its substratum. If a substance may not 
inhere in any substratum whatsoever, it will be difficult to explain how 
substances come and cease to be. On the other hand, if the relevant kind of 
inherence were restricted to inherence in a receptacle, it would seem that 
space and matter are the paradigm—if not the only—cases of substance.  
If we admit that forms may also inhere in substrata without being forms 
of these substrata, we can explain how it can be possible that the universe 
exists before there is anything other than the divine mind. Hence, the best 
thing to do is to account for both kinds of inherence. It will then turn out 
that the mind or intellect is not a substance in the same sense in which a 
body is a substance, and that thoughts inhere in the mind not in the sense in 
which properties inhere in bodies. The mind is not a receptacle, but a 
substratum of thought and action, whereas bodies are only receptacles of 
their properties. Likewise, bodily substances can only host potentials, and 
de dicto possibilities can only inhere in the mind. 
What matters here are not so much the possibly existing substances, but 
rather the further substances in which their possibilities subsist before they 
exist. These are the immaterial substances, mind and intellect, and 
according to Ghazali, they are related to that which subsists in them in a 
peculiar way. The distinction of substances and inherence relations into 
two types is not yet fully reflected in the top-level ontology presented 
earlier on in this paper. In addition to receptacles and things that inhere in 
them, we need to introduce entities that subsist in immaterial substances 
without inhering in them. This new class will include universals, de dicto 
possibilities, and probably also intentions and thoughts. All these “mental 
entities” do not inhere in the mind in the sense that they are forms of the 
mind or possibilities for the mind. Not even thoughts are forms of the 
mind, since we do not literally look inside our own minds when we 
contemplate them. Thoughts are possible facts. Likewise, intentions are not 
in the mind as in a receptacle, but are rather certain possibilities to act. 
These consequences are not elaborated by Ghazali, but they appear natural 
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and they are of utmost importance. The revision of the Aristotelian top-
level ontology that Ghazali recommends leads to an insight into the nature 
of the mind. Although there are good reasons for calling the mind a 
“substance”, since it is an individual and persistent locus of responsibility, 
there are also good reasons not to apply the schema of form and matter to 
this substance. Immaterial substances thus differ radically from material 
substances. 
Ghazali thus offers an alternative ontological framework for drawing 
the distinction between material and immaterial substances with which 
Augustine, Descartes and Locke were concerned. I have argued that the 
mind is a subject of thoughts and actions in that it is responsible for them 
rather than exemplifying them as its properties. The way in which this 
relation of the mind to its activities differs from spatial relations or the 
relation between an extended thing and its properties. This motivates the 
Cartesian distinction between extended and thinking substances and 
explains why the soul is thought to be an immaterial substance. In 
Ghazali’s terminology, the thinking substance differs in that it is not a 
receptacle of its thoughts and actions, but a substratum. He draws the same 
distinction, but not in terms of materiality. 
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